The 1947 partition of India is a period of history that has been given generous historical consideration and is studied in-depth across the world. The period marks several turning points in history, including the end of the British Raj, the start of an independent Indian subcontinent and the brutal single largest mass migration of humans. The historiography of the period of partition spreads wide and covers many themes from nationalism, colonialism, postcolonialism, migration and subaltern. The politics leading to the partition is also studied extensively.

In Sikh circles, the partition is certainly of great concern, as Sikhs arguably bore the brunt of migration and their homeland, Punjab, was divided. However, greater importance is provided to the aftermath of the declaration of independence, where millions of Sikhs were displaced or killed during the migration from the west to the east. The politics played by Sikhs is largely overlooked and deeply misunderstood. A trend of seeing Sikhs as mere victims of British, Muslim, and Hindu politics has emerged, which deeply undermines the important and decisive role played by Sikhs. Historiography on the partition and the transfer of power in India favours the notion that there were three actors involved, namely the British, Muslim League and Congress, and grants a few references to the Sikhs, only emphasising the situation the Sikhs found themselves in.

Despite the growth in the historical literature on the topic of Sikh politics, a few works of Khushwant Singh, Baldev Raj Nayar, and J.S. Grewal provide any meaningful commentary on Sikh politics during the 1940s. However, even then one finds the period of partition summarised in brief. The lack of historiography raises a few questions about the Sikhs in the 1940s. What was the Sikh response to the evolution of the Pakistan demand from 1940 to 1947? How and why did the Sikhs settle for the partition of their land, that left many of their people, sacred shrines and the most fertile lands sacrificed in the west? How did Sikh relations grow and change with the key political parties and actors?

Through this dissertation, I highlight the role of the Sikhs as political actors in the build-up to the partition. I present the Sikhs as the first to demand a partition of India, albeit hesitantly, to counter the narrative that the partition was thrust upon them by other political actors. I evaluate the strategies and efforts of Sikh political leaders made in response to Pakistan, the division of Punjab, and ultimately in the formation of an ‘East’ Punjab. I shall argue that any response made to various British, Muslim and Congress proposals, was rooted in the desire to safeguard their interests in a post-independent subcontinent. The Sikhs were in favour of a united India, and any form of partition was the last resort. The unity of India was more important than a Sikh state. Sikhs were not victims of the politics surrounding them but instead played a decisive role.

Dr Indu Banga provides an informative piece on Sikh politics during the partition, where she explains how the Sikh leadership reacted to the potential of Muslim domination. However, the work lacks to explain the justifications behind the Sikh responses, which is what I attempt to provide in the dissertation.

Kirpal Singh’s work on the Partition proved to be invaluable, as it provided a coherent chronology of the events leading to 1947. However, I did omit the Simla Conference and the Wavell Proposal from the dissertation as the Sikh responses did not include the demand for separation or partition. These remained as negotiations. Kirpal Singh also reproduces primary sources such as personal interviews with British dignitaries involved in the partition. I visited the Publication Bureau of Punjabi University, Patiala, to secure a copy of this text.

The Indian Annual Register, Transfer of Power documents and Governors’ Fortnightly Reports were the key primary sources used. Archive.org and the University library provided copies of these texts. I faced no difficulty in accessing these primary sources. The Times of India was a significant source that corroborated many other primary sources. These primary sources were official publications of contemporary documents.

During the completion of this dissertation, I attended a lecture by author and professor Gurharpal Singh on the topic of Sikh nationalism and the partition of India. Unfortunately, I was unable to source a copy of their recent work Sikh Nationalism. This text would have been a valuable secondary source for my research as Singh aims to provide an authoritative account of the Sikhs during the partition through his book.

Initially, I aimed to explore the Azad Punjab scheme in-depth, evaluating its practicality and failures, however, upon completing preliminary readings I realised there was a lack of primary sources. I then changed my approach to evaluating all Sikh proposals to Pakistan, excluding the Simla Conference and Wavell’s Proposals, as these were not responded to with demands for a separate nation, and Mountbatten had deposed Wavell’s plan.

Two maps are provided to give the reader an understanding of Punjab, its demographic, and its districts (pages VII and VIII respectively). The rivers of Punjab are also marked on the maps, which aids in visualising the various proposed boundaries. River Chenab was the desired boundary for many potential Sikh areas; however, several Muslim majority areas would be included, which would have been an unacceptable loss for Jinnah. The dissertation assumes the reader is aware of the political leaders mentioned within, such as Gandhi, Jinnah, Master Tara Singh, Gyani Kartar Singh and Baldev Singh.

Chapter One starts with the initial proposal of Pakistan. The period of focus begins in 1940, as the Lahore Resolution passed by the All India Muslim League was the first demand for the creation of a separate Muslim state. Sikhs reacted in protest and viewed Pakistan as a Muslim rule that would threaten their interests as a community. In response, the Sikhs presented Khalistan as a Sikh state. However, this was hoped to be an obstacle to Pakistan. The Sikhs did not want to rule and understood that their demand was impractical. The Pakistan demand was side-lined during the war effort, however, to gain further Indian support, the British sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India. He presented a draft promising dominion status to India. The draft was seen as explicit recognition of Pakistan. Sikhs considered the Draft a betrayal of their cause and importance. Sikhs would present the Azad Punjab scheme, an area where a population balance would guarantee no community could dominate the rest. This scheme faced heavy criticism, especially amongst Sikhs. I argue that these demands for separation were not serious and were grounded in fear of Muslim domination under Pakistan.

Chapter Two explores the increasing possibility of Pakistan. Gandhi would meet Jinnah upon his release from prison, and the C.R. Formula was presented to Jinnah. The partition of India and the possible partition of Punjab were proposed. The talks failed, as Jinnah was adamant about a completely independent Muslim nation. He refused to accept a broken Pakistan. The Sikhs viewed these negotiation attempts as a betrayal by Congress. The Azad Punjab scheme was represented as a distinctly separate state. However, Sikhs still hoped for a united India and freedom from Hindu or Muslim domination. The 1946 election proved the importance of the League. The Akalis, Congress and Unionist Party formed a coalition, managing to safeguard their position. The Cabinet Mission had sympathy for the Sikh cause and presented a loose confederal structure where provinces would decide on some issues personally, and others would be decided upon by the whole Union. Through negotiations with Congress, the Sikhs decided to cooperate with the installed interim government, gaining assurance their interests would be safeguarded.

Finally, Chapter Three sees Pakistan as an inevitability. Communal violence was on the rise, and Mountbatten prepared for the division of India. Sikhistan was revived, and the British encouraged Sikhs to negotiate for a Sikh area within Pakistan. Jinnah’s arrogance and Sikh stubbornness prevented any agreement from forming. Sikhs would now fight to retain as much of Punjab for India. They emphasised their connection to the land of Punjab, demanding this to be taken into consideration, however, the Commission saw population as the only necessary criteria for partition. The Boundary Commission would award thirteen districts of Punjab to India, and Punjab was thus divided.

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The Lahore Resolution of 1940, was the ‘magna carta’ of Pakistan. Throughout 1939, the All India Muslim League had been playing with the idea of physically dividing the country. The League, on March 23^rd 1940, passed a resolution which is seen to be a resolution for Pakistan. The League stated in the Annual Session at Lahore, that no constitutional plan would be acceptable to the Muslims of India unless it was ‘designed on the following basic principle viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority, as in the north-western and eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’ in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.’ Despite the vagueness and absence of detail, the Resolution was a demand for the ‘creation of a separate state’ which was to be carved out of areas of India where Muslims were the majority. This resolution would soon acquire the name ‘Pakistan Resolution’. The desire to establish a Muslim state was clear from the resolution. The 1941 census, as presented in Map 1, showed that the Muslim community had a majority of over 55 per cent. The population per community can be seen in Fig. 1 below. As the Punjab province had a Muslim majority population, it was expected to be included in the proposed Muslim state.

Congress leaders would attempt to ‘belittle the implications of this resolution’ in their own way. During their Ramgarh session, Congress made no reference to the resolution, ignoring it entirely. In the Harijan, Gandhi would describe the events following the Lahore resolution as ‘baffling’. Jawaharlal Nehru, in a speech given in Poona, would describe the Lahore resolution as ‘highly anti-national and pro-imperialist’, and a ‘foolish’ resolution that would not last any more than 24 hours.

Amongst the Sikh community, the Lahore Resolution ‘presented the prospects of permanent Muslim domination’ in the province of Punjab. The Sikh reaction was one of protest and a ‘virulent campaign’ was launched, yet this was not unexpected. The Unionist Government in the province of Punjab was already playing ‘communal politics’, and the idea of a ‘Pakistan’, to the Sikh community, meant ‘Muslim rule’ which would jeopardise and end ‘their political aspirations, economic advantages, and cultural traditions’. There were growing tensions between Sikhs and the Unionist Party, and the creation of Pakistan was feared to be an intensification of the mistreatment of Sikhs. The Shahidgunj incident, where Muslims claimed a Mosque situated on the grounds of a Gurdwara should not be pulled down, had spread over years, leading to many clashes between Sikhs and Muslims. Sikhs demanded the removal of restrictions placed on Jhatka meat and there were incidents of Sikhs being killed for Jhatka. The prospect of a ‘Pakistan’ was seen as a ‘threat to the very existence of the Sikh community’. The reaction against the demands of the League were strong and came from several Sikh platforms.

Sikh political parties, including the leading Sikh party, the Akali Dal, were ‘as much against the ‘undiluted communal Raj’ as against the ‘vivisection’ of the country. The Akali response was clear and blunt – Pakistan would be ‘wholeheartedly resisted’. To Master Tara Singh, the Lahore resolution was a ‘mad’ call for ‘civil war’, and if the League wanted Pakistan they would need to cross ‘an ocean of Sikh blood’. The All India Akali Conference held at Attari concluded resisting the ‘growing endeavours of certain Muslims to covert the Punjab in to a part of Pakistan’. The summer of 1940 saw relentless campaigns by the Akalis ‘to whip up popular opposition to’ the resolution. The attempts made to rally opposition against the Lahore resolution were proving to be successful as there was now an atmosphere of unease amongst the Sikh community. The Akalis had gained popularity for being ‘the champion of the Sikh cause against Pakistan’. The Pakistan resolution was presented to the Sikh community as the return to ‘an unhappy past’ where Sikhs were persecuted by Muslims. The Akalis organised a Ghallughara Day, which aimed to remember the massacre of Sikhs led by Ahmad Shah Abdali. The Akalis reminded the Sikhs of the atrocities committed on their people by Muslims, and through remembering the past they aimed to express disagreements with the possibility of Muslim domination in Punjab. The emphasis on the danger the Sikhs would be in, if Pakistan was to be formed, spread across Punjab, which is evident from the ‘feverish purchase of arms and ammunition’ and from the view of Sikh soldiers that they need to fight their ‘own war with the Muslims’ and not a war overseas that is not their own. The Sikh leadership successfully expressed opposition to the Pakistan resolution through public displays and through rallying people against Pakistan.

For the Sikh politician, Sundar Singh Majithia, the Lahore resolution was ‘fraught with the most dangerous consequences’ which would be detrimental to the interests of all the communities of the nation. He would state in the Khalsa National Party conference that the Sikhs would not ‘tolerate for a single day the undiluted communal Raj of any community in the Punjab, which was not only their homeland but their holy land’. Majithia proclaimed that the Sikhs would ‘claim back the sovereignty of Punjab’ which was given to the British by Maharaja Dulip Singh to ‘hold in trust for him’ if the League ‘would demand Pakistan’. This was one of the ‘angry reactions’ that called for ‘Khalsa Raj’ from ‘Jammu to Jamrud’, the area which was seen to have been given to the British for ‘safe-keeping’ by the young king. There were suggestions to bring the princely states of the Sikhs, thirteen districts of Punjab and the hills of Simla together to create a ‘Khalistan’. Khalistan would act as a buffer state between Pakistan and India. During the All India Sikh Conference of 1940, it was proclaimed that if the ‘Muslim League insisted upon (Pakistan), the Sikhs would demand Sikh Raj in Punjab’.

The demand for a separate Sikh state was the most extreme response to the Lahore Resolution, and despite it being requested by all major Sikh parties, the Akalis tried to clarify what the Sikh state meant. Master Tara Singh clarified that the Akalis ‘did not want the rule of any single community’, not even the rule of Sikhs and that Khalistan was not desirable or practicable. The Akalis opposed the Lahore Resolution at the U.P Central Sikh Conference and stressed the fact that Sikhs would aspire for ‘complete swaraj’ and any attempt made to ‘divide India into communal provinces’ would be met with opposition. Even in the pamphlet published by Dr V.S. Bhatti, it is evident that the idea of a Khalistan was a means of opposing the idea of Pakistan through the repeated use of the phrase ‘if Pakistan is to be conceded’. The Sikhs did not want their own state and understood the impracticality of their demand. Yet, they hoped that their demand for a separate homeland would be an obstacle to the creation of Pakistan. The Sikhs feared domination by the Muslim community and wholeheartedly opposed the Lahore Resolution. Sikh leaders made attempts to remind the Sikh community of the oppression their people bared at the hands of the Muslims, to help them realise that what happened in the past and what was brewing under the Unionist Party would only escalate further.

The Sikh leaders knew that the idea of ‘Pakistan posed no immediate threat’ as the British were not concerning themselves with the ‘constitutional future of India’ whilst they were busy with the war. The Akalis and Congress would find them both splintering over the war effort, which diverted the attention of Punjab politics away from the prospect of Pakistan which was now on hold.

In March of 1942, however, the possibility of Pakistan resurfaced. The British War cabinet had sent Sir Stafford Cripps to India to ‘win over Indian support for the war effort’. Attempting to appease India, the Draft Proposal by Cripps stated that the Indian Union shall be equal in every respect to the United Kingdom and shall be free to leave the Commonwealth if it wished. All provinces would be offered the right to stay ‘out of the proposed Constituent Assembly and decide on their separate political status’. The Draft Declaration would become a landmark in Punjab history. The Draft gave provinces the right to secede from the centre, and should they desire were to be given a new constitution that would give them the ‘same full status as the Indian Union’. The ‘local option’ clause meant that if the Muslims desired, provinces with a Muslim majority could secede from the centre.

This clause was seen to be the ‘first public admission of the possibility of Pakistan’. The option to secede from the centre was a ‘victory for Jinnah’, as it assured Pakistan after the war. In 1942, the Pakistan resolution was two years old, and the Muslim League did not have a strong position in Punjab, therefore the Draft pleased Jinnah who saw it as assurance. He could now ‘have a sigh of relief’ as the idea for Pakistan had gained explicit recognition.

Though Jinnah was pleased with the Draft, the Hindu Mahasabha had disapproved of it, who saw India as ‘one and indivisible’, and believed it would not be in the best interest of India if the Sabha supported any proposal that would involve the division of the nation. Sikh leaders shared the political stage with the Mahasabha in opposing Pakistan, showing their support for a united India. Though Congress rejected the proposal, they felt unable to compel people ‘of any territorial unit to remain’ in the Indian Union against their will. Congress aimed to maintain their ‘non-partisan image’ and therefore would not compel provinces to remain within the Indian Union.

The toughest resistance to the Cripps proposal came from the Sikhs, who felt their cause had ‘been lamentably betrayed’. The concerns of the Sikhs centred around the ‘non-accession proposal’. The proposal ‘raised the spectre of Pakistan again’, as the ‘local option’ clause was viewed as the British accepting Pakistan.’ As Punjab was a Muslim majority province, the Sikhs were concerned by the province seceding from the centre, which would mean that the Sikhs would be subjected to Muslim domination. The politics of the Unionists, under a Punjabi façade, had given Sikhs ‘an experience of Muslim domination’, which led the Akalis to ‘dread the prospect of its perpetuation’ under explicit Muslim domination. Sir Glancy, the Governor of Punjab, recognised the Sikhs as being ‘in danger’, and their fears of ‘everlasting subjection to an unsystematic and tyrannical Muhammadan Raj’. The lack of reference in the Draft to the possibility of population transfer and adjustment of boundaries further added to the Sikh fear of Muslim rule.

Master Tara Singh explicitly declared opposition to the Draft, stating that the Sikhs would not tolerate ‘Mohammadan rule, open or disguised’, and the Sikh All Parties Committee memorandum expressed determination to resist ‘by all possible means’ the separation of Punjab from the Indian Union. From the language of the Sikh resolutions it was clear that ‘grave forebodings’ weighed on the minds of the Sikhs. Sikh leaders would rally the Sikh community to oppose Cripps’ proposal. The Vaisakhi celebrations and melas between April and May of 1942 would become rallies opposing the resolutions, with speakers denouncing Pakistan.

To weaken the prospect of Pakistan, the Sikhs would again propose a separate state. To avoid domination by the Muslims, the Sikhs would demand that Punjab be divided into two provinces, so they maintain a decisive voice in the Eastern province. The combined Hindu and Sikh population of the East would decide to remain with the Indian Union. A delegation of Sikh leaders would meet Sir Cripps and propose this redistribution of provincial powers in Punjab. Master Tara Singh would argue the Sikhs ‘feel that they cannot attain their rightful position or can effectively protect their interests unless Punjab is redistributed into two provinces with river Ravi forming the boundary between them’.

Here it is crucial to understand that the Sikhs did not wish to have a separate state to dominate; they understood that their dense distribution over Punjab meant they could not rule. However, a province could be created where no community would dominate the Sikhs. A state where Sikhs were not dominated by any single community was the basis of the Azad Punjab Scheme which was presented as ‘an alternative to the Cripps Proposals’. ‘Azad Punjab’ is first mentioned in the July 1942 All India Akali Conference, where a province consisting mainly of Eastern Punjab and some canal colony districts is proposed. The population balance would be 40% Muslim, 40% Hindu and 20% Sikh, which would mean no single community could dominate, hence the name Azad – free. Each community would be free. River Chenab would divide Azad Punjab and the Muslim majority province. The boundaries would be defined by an independent and impartial commission ‘after taking into consideration the population, property, land revenue and historical traditions of each of the three communities’.

The Azad Punjab Scheme was criticised heavily, especially amongst Sikhs. To the British, the objections to Khalistan, or the Azad Punjab, were ‘greater than those which lie in the path of Pakistan’. The Sikhs did not command a majority in any district of the Punjab province. Only in the Muslim state of Malerkotla did the Sikhs have a majority. This was known to the Sikhs, who emphasised that they could not dominate in Punjab, however, that did not mean they should not be given protection. The word Azad also created the wrong impression that Punjab would be an independent state, separate from the Indian Union. The Sikhs and Hindus of the west opposed the scheme as it implied their exclusion. The scheme was criticised for being ‘communal, anti-Hindu and anti-national’. Master Tara Singh was quick to clarify that the Azad Punjab was not ‘anti-national or another Pakistan’, but it was ‘intended to be an alternative to the division of the country’. It was known to the Sikhs that they hold no majority anywhere to demand a Sikh state, and Master Tara Singh insisted that the Sikhs ‘wished to remain in India and should not be forced’ into Pakistan. Azad Punjab was to be a province within the Indian Union. Through the creation of Azad Punjab, Sikhs and Hindus would aim to ‘get rid of the spectre of Pakistan’. It was not to be viewed as a Sikh state on ‘the Pakistan principle’. Amending the boundaries of Punjab would mean a majority of Hindus and Sikhs would be removed from under Muslim domination. As Azad Punjab was an attempt to cripple the Pakistan scheme, Hindus and Sikhs in the west would not be excluded from India, in fact, the scheme would have safeguarded their inclusion in the Indian Union.

This demand for a separate province, that guaranteed no community would dominate the rest and aimed to prevent the formation of Pakistan, was rooted in a genuine fear that if Pakistan was established, then the Sikh community would be ‘lost for ever’. The Azad Punjab scheme was a defensive strategy that had been presented as a response to the recognition Pakistan received from the British through the Cripps Proposals. Sikhs believed that the ‘creation of Azad Punjab’ would get rid of Pakistan.

The Cripps mission proved to be a failure, as no Indian political party had accepted it. However, it still proved itself to be a significant document. It provided provinces a passage to secede from the Indian Union and form their own union and constitutions. The Drafts also implied that the British had accepted the basic demand for Pakistan.

Following the Lahore Resolution that presented the idea of Pakistan, the Sikhs passed resolutions opposing Pakistan. They would also present the idea of a separate Sikh state if Pakistan was to secede. The Sikhs expressed concerns over their existence under Muslim domination, fearing an escalation in the oppression they were experiencing under the Unionist government. The Cripps Mission would reignite the call for Pakistan, further inciting fear amongst the Sikhs as the Draft proposals recognised and legitimised the demand for a separate Muslim nation under the plans for establishing a loose federation in the sub-continent. The Sikhs would push back, refusing to be dominated by Muslims and to be made to leave the Indian Union. They would present the Azad Punjab Scheme, a plan to redraw the boundaries of the Punjab province that guaranteed no single community could dominate the rest. The scheme was flawed; however, it needs to be understood as the Sikh attempt to cripple the prospect of Pakistan and safeguard their interests and existence.

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Upon his release, Gandhi came to the rescue of Jinnah, who had been rebuffed by the Unionist Premier of Punjab. A ‘renewed version of the Cripps offer’ was presented to the Muslim League by Gandhi, which was proposed by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. Rajagopalachari was previously made to resign from his position as Congress Premier of Madras for proposing a resolution in favour of territorial self-determination. The proposal, also known as the C.R. Formula, advocated for a plebiscite by a 60 per cent majority vote in the areas contested by the League. This included the province of Punjab. Rajagopalachari had proposed not only the partition of India but also the potential partition of Punjab.

Meetings between Gandhi and Jinnah centred around the Formula. Pakistan, as proposed in the 1940 Lahore Resolution, was to be accepted by Gandhi, on the condition that matters common to both nations are to be decided upon together. These would include defence, commerce, finance, foreign policy etc. If the League was willing to extend support to Congress in its aim for complete independence, then Congress was willing to concede to Pakistan. Though Gandhi approached Jinnah ‘as an individual’ and not as a representative of Congress, the C.R. Formula was blessed by Gandhi, thus it was associated with Congress.

However, the talks failed to produce an agreement. Jinnah insisted on a completely independent state that covered the Muslim majority provinces and had complete independence to decide on subjects of governance. Gandhi’s insistence on the right to self-determination for all minorities was ‘totally unacceptable’ to Jinnah as it would mean alteration of the boundaries of Muslim majority provinces. This would leave a ‘husk’ of Pakistan. However, Jinnah was pleased that Gandhi had accepted the principle of Pakistan. The talks strengthened Jinnah’s position, and his demand for partition would need to be taken seriously. Congress was negotiating with Jinnah as an equal, and the British understood that without his approval no constitutional plan could be decided. Jinnah showed no signs of compromising over Pakistan. Jinnah was now openly advocating for Pakistan, claiming all six Muslim provinces. Any proposals to amend the boundaries were rejected by Jinnah.

The Sikhs reacted strongly to the C.R. Formula and the Gandhi-Jinnah talks. Gandhi’s attempt to reach out to Jinnah and the Formula were seen as betrayals. Congress was seen to have reversed its stance on Pakistan. The Formula was a breach of the 1929 Lahore pledge where Congress had promised to not do anything that affected the Sikhs without considering them first. The Sikhs strongly denounced the Formula as being ‘unfair and detrimental’ to the interests of the nation and the Sikhs. If enforced, the Sikhs would find themselves divided into two and ‘in perpetual bondage’, as the Formula would divide Punjab with seventeen districts going to Pakistan and twelve districts with India. The Sikhs with no majority in any district would be subject to Muslim and Hindu rule, putting them ‘under perpetual slavery of the two’. Gandhi and Jinnah were tyrants that wanted to ‘impose Hindu and Muslim majorities on the Sikhs’ through dividing India. Gandhi was ignoring the Sikhs, who was appeasing the League by sacrificing their needs. Master Tara Singh hoped that Gandhi would sit with a Sikh deputation to hear the Sikh case, however, he deemed meeting Sikh representatives as ‘unnecessary’ because his influence could not affect the Formula even if Jinnah accepted it. The total disregard for the Sikh cause shown by Gandhi infuriated the Sikhs, who would raise abuses against Gandhi at gatherings. Santokh Singh, the opposition leader in the Punjab Assembly, declared that ‘no one, not even ten Gandhi’s, had a right to barter away the Sikhs’.

Sikh survival was deemed at stake, as they were not involved in any negotiations despite being the most critically affected community. The Sikhs opposed the division of India, however, they wanted a position where their people were neither under Hindu nor Muslim domination. The Azad Punjab demand was reiterated as a province in the Indian Union. Through an amendment made at the All Parties Sikh Conference, the demand for a separate province became a demand for a Sikh state. The Sikh state was to be formed based on Sikh importance and the land held by them in Punjab. For the Sikhs, Punjab was a Sikh province and they refused to be exiled from it.

Where other actors wished to divide India to ‘crush and finish’ the Sikhs, the Sikhs desired division to save their community and its interests. The formation of Pakistan would ruin the Sikhs, who were already tired of Muslim rule in Punjab. The Sikhs wanted power and would not live on the charity of others. However, the demand for a separate Sikh state was the last resort, that was rooted in fear of Hindu and Muslim domination. The proposals made for a Sikh state were conditional; if Pakistan seceded, and India divided, then the Sikhs would want their own state. The main aim of the Sikhs was the prevention of Pakistan and they were ready to resist any attempt to form Pakistan, including British bayonets. The Sikhs did not want India to be divided, and if Muslims could not be made to remain in India then the Sikhs could not be forced to leave India. The Sikhs stood for the unity of India first and foremost, and wished for Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs to live together. The division of India would not be tolerated. Though demands were made for a Sikh state, they were held back to allow space for negotiations. The Sikhs wished to remain ‘flexible’. The reluctance shown by Sikhs to push for a Sikh state would be rooted in their conviction that they had a future in United India, and that Pakistan could be prevented. In Punjab, the League was weak, which was reassuring to the Akalis, therefore during the 1945-46 election, the Akalis ‘relegated the demand for a separate state’. The Akalis decided to highlight the advancement of the ‘freedom, unity, integrity and welfare’ of the ‘motherland’. A Sikh state was the last resort, and not a welcomed choice. Despite provocative speeches advocating for a Sikh state, it was clear from many Sikh stages that Sikhs would rather remain in a United India. The Sikhs wished for ‘equal rights like brothers’, and a ‘common rule of all communities’; not the domination of one. Sikhs did not want a separate state to rule, and neither did they desire to rule Punjab in a United India – they simply wanted freedom from the domination of either Hindus or Muslims, and they were ready to suffer for freedom. Politician, Sardar Ishar Singh at the All India Akali Conference declared that the Sikh ‘ideal is a free India where the Sikhs are also free like all other communities.’ The Sikhs stood for a noble idea, that was formed on unity of communities and the nation itself.

The 1946 General Election result was a testament to the rising popularity of Jinnah in Punjab (Fig. 2). The Muslim League had become the largest party with 75 seats in the 175-member provincial legislative assembly. This was a massive increase from the two seats won by the League in 1937. The League claim to be the sole representative of the Muslim voice in Punjab was now proven. Pakistan was clearly endorsed by the Muslim electorate, and the Sikhs were convinced that the British would now concede Pakistan.

The Unionist Party saw a plunge, winning only 20 seats. It was clear that the Unionist Party was losing its grip over Punjab, and the Akalis knew it could not offer any protection to the Sikhs. Congress won 51 seats, and the Akalis won 22 seats. As no party had a majority, the Sikhs used their 22 seats to secure political safeguards through a coalition with either Congress or the League.

With the prospect of Pakistan becoming greater, the Akalis saw that a partnership with the League would be the best way to safeguard their interests. Thus, the Akalis and the League explored the possibility of a coalition. The Akalis demanded that the League denounced any demand for Pakistan, however, the League refused to do, stating that the Sikhs were in no position to discuss the Pakistan issue. Whereas the Akalis fought the election with Pakistan in the back, the League fought the election on the Pakistan issue, therefore it was unwilling to budge from the demand that provided it with such electoral success. It was on this condition that the negotiations failed.

The Akalis would then look towards Congress. Sardar Baldev Singh mediated between the Akalis, Congress and Unionists. Congress, being aware of the damage caused by the C.R. Formula, assured the Sikhs of its aim to commit to the 1929 resolution. The Congress-Akali-Unionist coalition was thus formed. The League, having failed to come to an agreement with either the Akalis or Congress, now found itself in opposition. Punjab had changed. No longer were Punjabis just Punjabis, they became Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs, and the election created a divide where on one side were the Muslims of Punjab, and on the other were all the non-Muslims.

The Akalis had managed to safeguard its position in Punjab. However, this would be temporary.

In March of 1946, a Mission, consisting of three members was sent to India. Their key issue was a united India versus Pakistan. The Sikhs met the Mission with apprehension, as it made explicit that Britain was serious about ending its rule in India. During the Raj, the Sikhs were assured protection as a minority due to them being a favoured martial race, however, now that their patrons were serious about leaving, the Sikhs saw their last support that provided any security to Sikh interests exiting. ‘Dejection, resentment and indignation’ weighed on the Sikhs.

On March 22, 1946, Sikh leaders met the Mission and demanded a Sikh state – Sikhistan – as an ‘additional provincial unit’ in United India. The demand had been floating since 1946, as a response to the C.R. Formula, but it was given little notice and the demand was side-lined during the 1946 Akali election campaigns. Sikhistan was different to Azad Punjab which was proposed as a redrawing of the boundaries of Punjab to exclude Muslim majority areas, therefore creating a province where no community could dominate. Azad Punjab could not be seen as a Sikh state, however, Sikhistan would be a Sikh federation, and it would have a distinctly Sikh character. All significant Sikh Gurdwaras and shrines would be included in this area. This state would still be a territory where no one community held a majority. The Sikh state was proposed through desperation, with the aim to push their cause before the British, by showing them that there is a fear of being subjected to Muslim rule and that they need secure representation in future governments of Punjab. The Sikh leaders understood that their demands could not be taken seriously. Even Master Tara Singh would only vaguely mention a separate Sikh state that shall either federate with Pakistan or Hindustan.

In April 1946, a document was published that was the clearest argument for a Sikh state. The authors saw the division of India as inevitable and believed Sikhs would be slaves in either nation. The Sikhs could not be safe till either majority gave up its majority status and was on par with the minority. It was clarified that the demand for a Sikh state was not rooted in communalism but was the only guarantee for survival. On one hand the Sikhs faced Muslim hostility, which was a historical trend, and on the other, they had Hindu nationalism that attempted to ‘reabsorb them into Hinduism’. The Sikhs demanded the land they were already settled on and that had their ‘cultural and educational enterprises’. Sikhs did not want to lose the land they had flourished on since the start, and their demand for a Sikh state was an attempt to save this land. Though this text preferred separation over a united India, the demand was based on fear of oppression, again showing that Sikh responses to proposals were rooted in the need to protect their future in Punjab.

The Mission, though it was understanding of the Sikh case, was not going to take the demand seriously. The Sikhs were not geographically situated in a way which they held a majority anywhere, making it impossible for the British to proceed with this demand. The Sikhs were an important minority, however, they were not important enough that the British would side-track from their key objective of forming an agreement between Congress and the League. The League was adamant for Pakistan, and Congress for a united India, therefore no agreement was formed. Lord Pethick-Lawrence assured the Sikhs that their ‘anxieties’ were kept in mind as the Mission proposal was being drafted.

The Cabinet Mission would then propose a three-tier model, with a loose confederal structure. The Union would handle all ‘foreign affairs, defence and communications’, and the provinces individually would decide on remaining subjects. Three groups would be created, where Section ‘A’ would include all areas that were not claimed to be a Muslim majority, Section ‘B’ would include the western Muslim provinces, including Punjab, and Section ‘C’ would include the eastern Muslim provinces. The Mission hoped to have satisfied Congress as the Indian Union was in place and hoped to please the League as they were given the right to direct ‘their own essential interests… in their own way’.

The Mission did take the Sikh case into consideration, as the Mission rejected Pakistan ‘to prevent an injustice on the Sikh Community.’ Even the idea of a smaller Pakistan was negated as it would mean partitioning of Punjab that would leave the Sikhs divided. However, the Sikhs were unhappy with the proposal as no ‘specific safeguards’ were provided. The Mission ‘liquidated the position of the Sikhs in their homeland.’ Though Pakistan was rejected, the Sikhs would still be in a Muslim dominated section and subject to a Muslim majority. At Amritsar in June 1946, a conference held revealed the crisis and desperation spreading amongst the Sikhs. As the proposals were damaging to Sikh interests, the Sikhs decided to boycott the proposed constituent assembly. A Panthic Pratinidhi Board was set up to represent nearly every Sikh organisation, which decreed that all Sikh members of legislative assemblies should boycott the constituent assembly as well as the interim government. The formation of this Board demonstrated that all Sikh parties and sects were united to fight against the domination presented by Pakistan.

The Sikhs understood their protests against the Mission proposal would have little impact on the British, so they needed to secure the support of a main party in India. The committee would negotiate with political parties before initiating any struggle, and there were hopes that negotiations would redress the grievances of Sikhs. The Sikhs would negotiate with the League. The League offered Sikhs ‘generous weightage in the civil service’, however, the Sikhs were suspicious of this ‘superficially attractive offer’. Negotiations with the League failed, as the League would not agree to a partition that would allow the formation of Sikhistan or drop the demand for Pakistan.

Congress had a more ‘positive attitude towards the Sikhs’ as Congress needed them. Congress was hesitant to accept the Mission proposals as they viewed the Muslim dominated sections as a hindrance to the central government functioning effectively. An ‘injustice had been done to the Sikhs’ by the Mission and Congress would endeavour to protect the ‘just interests’ of the Sikhs. Through the negotiations with Congress, the Panthic Board would cooperate with the interim government and reversed the decision to boycott the constituent assembly. The Sikhs had again established a hold that assured safeguarding of their interests.

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On January 5^th of 1947, Congress accepted the Cabinet mission. The safeguards provided through Congress negotiations had collapsed. Sikhs saw themselves being placed ‘under a permanent Muslim majority rule’.

Communal relations were deteriorating. Communal killings and constant hostility demonstrated the breakup of India was inevitable. The League aimed to overthrow the coalition Government, and was openly hostile against the government, organising protests, boycotts, and demonstrations. These agitations collapsed the coalition government and proved too much for Khizar Hayat Khan, who resigned as the Premier of Punjab. Governors’ rule was implemented in Punjab following riots that had Sikhs bearing the ‘main brunt of communal fury’. Muslim animosity against Sikhs was evident. Sikh police were sometimes targeted by Muslim mobs. Congress would agree to a partition as the only solution to communal violence.

Within a month of Mountbatten’s arrival, it was clear that the division of the nation could not be averted. He had noted that Punjab was preparing for civil war. Since the 1946 elections, membership of private armies such as the RSS and Muslim League National Guard increased. To respond to the League’s ‘well-trained semi-military’ Sikh leaders called for the ‘formation of a Sikh army’ for the ‘eventual showdown with the Muslims’. Master Tara Singh expressed that the Muslims could not be trusted and that a Sikh volunteer army was being formed to respond to the communal troubles caused by the League. Therefore, he included the partition of Punjab in his proposals.

The Akalis would adopt various strategies to keep the Sikh population together. Sikhistan, a state between Chenab and Jamuna, was revived, to be based on ‘landed property, sacred shrines and other interests of the Sikhs’. However, Mountbatten made it clear that Sikhistan was not viable, and that regardless of the diving line, much of the Sikh population would fall into Pakistan. The British, wishing to avoid the partition of Punjab and the bloodshed between communities, encouraged the Sikhs to consider an autonomous Sikh area within Pakistan. The Sikh community would remain intact as a fourteen percent minority in Pakistan, but in India, they would be submerged in the Hindu majority. A partition would divide the Sikhs into weak minorities in both states.

Gyani Kartar Singh toyed with this idea, who had hopes of an agreement forming but faced opposition from Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh. Sikh parleys with the League were a ‘strategy to secure as much of the area inhabited by Sikhs for the Indian Punjab as possible’. Unfortunately, Jinnah also provided no ‘coherent and acceptable guarantee of their safety’. His indifference towards any agreement was matched by Sikh stubbornness. Jinnah proclaimed, ‘Sikhs could go to the devil in their own way’ as they ‘demanded the partition of Punjab.’ The League’s attempt to ban the Kirpan was seen as an attack on the ‘fundamental rights’ of the Sikh. Sikhs in western districts, where they were outnumbered, faced violence. Riots targeting Sikhs increased the mistrust and fear of Muslim domination, therefore there was no understanding between the League and the Sikhs. Pakistan was no longer avoidable, and conciliation with the League was off the table.

The Sikh plan now was to retain as much ‘Sikh area’ from Pakistan. If Pakistan could not be prevented, Sikhs were adamant to deny Muslims the entirety of Punjab. Sikh legislators demanded the redrawing of boundary lines along the Chenab, which would have allowed ninety percent of the Sikhs to fall in the Indian Punjab. The Sikhs saw the Boundary Commission plan as ambiguous and requested that ‘exchange of population with property’, ‘land revenue paid’ by Sikhs, Sikh ‘religious and cultural institutions’ and their historic role in Punjab be made clear as the ‘other factors’ the plan suggested to take into consideration. Hindu and Sikh legislators stuck to this demand till the boundary awards were announced. They believed that the lack of provisions for population and property transfer would defeat the point of partition. For Mountbatten, population was the only condition for partition. Sikhs feared being split in the middle if the partition line was based on Muslim and non-Muslim districts. Areas that inhabited a total of half a million Sikhs, many sacred shrines and fertile land, would be lost to the Muslims. The Sikhs reiterated that the only line of partition acceptable would be along the Chenab. The Sikhs expected the Commission to not differ much from the provisional lines, however, Mountbatten provided no assurances for the Sikhs to be optimistic.

The Mountbatten Plan of June 3, 1947, delivered the partition of India into two sovereign nations. Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh accepted the plan. The fate of the Sikhs lay in the decision of the Boundary Commission. The Commission was told that ‘any partition that did not secure the integrity and solidarity of the Sikhs would be unacceptable and would create a difficult situation.’ The areas of Lahore, Lyallpur, Gujranwala, and Sialkot were requested to be included in East Punjab, taking into consideration the land held by Sikhs and the historical and religious sites of the Sikhs. Nankana Sahib, the birthplace of the founder of the Sikh faith, and one canal system were requested for the Sikhs. These demands were unrealistic to the Commission; however, they underlined the Sikh concern for their future aspirations based on their unwavering belief of being a distinct and sovereign community. They stressed the economic, cultural, and historical importance of Sikhs in Punjab. Baldev Singh argued that as the partition was being considered to meet Sikh demands, the Commission should be instructed to ensure ‘that as a large a percentage of Sikh population as possible’ should be included in east Punjab.

The Commission, appointed in July of 1947, set terms which meant Chenab could not be the western boundary of East Punjab. The Commission had awarded thirteen of the twenty-nine districts of Punjab to India. A small part of Lahore and a larger part of Gurdaspur were brought into India. Jinnah viewed the Award as ‘unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse’.

The Sikhs saw the Awards as a threat that would split their community, and donned black armbands and led prayers in Gurdwaras in opposition. No one was satisfied with the Awards. Sikhs had been unable to secure any substantial ‘guarantee of their security’ despite the violence in the province proving that Sikhs could not expect any security under Muslim domination.

The hopes for Sikhistan were buried by the Awards, and the Sikhs lost the land they had historical and cultural roots in, and the land they saved from many foreign invasions in the past. Their attempts at preventing Pakistan had failed, and their final fight to retain as much of Punjab had resulted in an unsatisfactory division that split their community. The largest mass migration of humans followed the partition, that saw millions of people killed or displaced.

This dissertation aimed to demonstrate that the Sikhs wholeheartedly rejected the idea of Pakistan. They viewed Pakistan as a threat to their existence and attempted to prevent its formation. However, if Punjab could not be stopped from becoming part of Pakistan, then the Sikhs demanded amendments to the boundaries of the Punjab province. Their attempts were rooted in saving their existence and interests, and there was no desire to rule. The Sikhs desired a united India, more so than their own separate state, but as the possibility of Pakistan grew, Sikhs turned their strengths towards maintaining as much of their homeland for India.

On the 15^th of August 1947, India had become an independent subcontinent with two sovereign states: India and Pakistan. Punjab had been partitioned, with much of the Sikh population in East Punjab. Many non-Muslims had migrated to East Punjab.

The 1940 Lahore Resolution alarmed the Sikhs. This demand was seen as a threat to all the Sikhs held dear, their heritage, interests, land, possessions, and their existence as a distinct community. The willingness of the British and Congress to appease the League, for the future of a free India, only heightened Sikh anxieties. Though most initially viewed the demand for Pakistan as baseless, the Sikhs of Punjab understood the seriousness of it. Sikh leaders insisted on a united India, stressing its integrity.

Khalistan was the first counter to Pakistan. It was a state envisioned to include Sikh princely states, the districts between Jamuna and Sutlej, the hills of Simla and the districts till Chenab. As there was no explicit plan for this state, this was presented to cripple the idea of Pakistan.

Stafford Cripps’s proposal, which was fundamentally a formal acknowledgement of Pakistan by the British, was rejected by the Sikhs. The Azad Punjab scheme was presented in self-defence as an alternative to the division of the nation. This was to be a province where Muslims and Hindus held equal weightage of 40 per cent and the Sikhs held the remaining 20 per cent, creating a situation where no community could dominate. Many Sikhs rejected this idea, as the suggested border was to be Ravi, which meant Sikhs of the west saw themselves as being neglected.

The C.R. Formula, presented to Jinnah and blessed by Gandhi, was also rejected by the Sikhs. Sikhistan was revived, as a new face of Cripps’ earlier proposal. Sikh interests were neglected by Congress, and the Sikhs understood they stood alone. In the meetings with the Cabinet Mission, the Sikhs echoed their demand for a united India. In the case where the division of the nation was probable, the Sikhs would then insist on an independent Sikh state, separate from both Hindustan and Pakistan.

The Akalis did not attempt to secure an area in which they dominated but instead aimed for an area where no single community was able to dominate. They attempted to secure an area in which the political, cultural, and economic interests of the Sikhs were safe. The demand for a separate state was not presented to the Sikh population in mass as it remained a bargaining tool for political parleys for Sikh leaders.

Due to the looming reality of the British departing, and the increasing possibility of Pakistan, throughout the 1940s, the safeguarding of their political future became the primary concern of the Sikhs. The genuine fear of being a minority subjected to a Muslim – or even a Hindu – majority post-independence, prompted their powerful response to Pakistan. To achieve the aim of not being subject to a Muslim majority, various strategies were used, however, all had the same empirical content. The proposals of an Azad Punjab province, Khalistan or Sikhistan, and the autonomous Sikh area within Pakistan and the eventual formation of an East Punjab all prove the efforts made by the Sikhs to secure political safeguards as the British Raj came to an end. Various pacts, such as the Akali-Congress-Unionist coalition, agreements with Congress and the attempts to come to an understanding with the League, further demonstrate attempts to establish safeguards. The aim was always to save the region between Chenab and Jamuna for the Sikhs, and their future. The Sikhs did not want to be ruled nor did they want to rule.

The relentless opposition to Pakistan by the Sikhs had convinced the British that Sikhs would prevent the formation of Pakistan and the loss of their homeland, and holy land, by any means possible. The increasing communal violence in Punjab, and the preparations on a scale of a civil war, finally led to the partition of Punjab. Jinnah was forced to accept the husk of Pakistan he had earlier declined. Sikhs had consistently opposed Pakistan. They played a decisive and active role in deciding the future of Punjab and were not passive victims of the politics of the time. The Sikhs had managed to save a significant portion of Punjab for India, similar to how their ancestors would wrest Punjab from invasions in the past. In a sense, East Punjab, which was secured through unrelenting pressure and strategies by the Sikhs, was a gift to independent India from the Akalis.

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